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   n recent years it has become an oft-cited truism that the majority of 
twenty-first century armed conflicts will contain a cyber element. The 2008 
conflict between Russia and Georgia was the first publically available indi-
cator of how cyber and conventional force might be used together in an 
inter-State conflict.1 Beyond such a relatively clear-cut instance of full-
blown international armed conflict, many ongoing situations of crisis, both 
below and above the level of armed conflict, have attracted a significant 
and persistent cyber component. Examples include the cyber intifada be-
tween Israeli and Palestinian hackers, which has continued since the in-
crease in violence at the outset of the second intifada in 2000; the dispute 
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between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which has an ongoing and per-
nicious cyber element involving groups on both sides with varying degrees 
of alleged State sponsorship; and the Arab Spring, in which many of the 
States involved used a variety of Internet surveillance, monitoring, censor-
ship and control techniques, and in some cases—notably Tunisia and more 
recently Syria—hacked the accounts and Internet content of individuals 
engaged in the revolution.2  
At the same time, there is a discernible trend on the part of the UN Se-
curity Council to authorize various forms of peace operations tasked with 
an array of functions that are deployed into situations of armed conflicts 
and other crises. A combination of both trends—the increase of conflict 
and crisis situations with a cyber component and the deployment of com-
plex peace operations—makes it only natural to assume that peacekeepers 
will increasingly find themselves on missions in which cyber incidents will 
occur during, following or even in the absence of, conventional hostilities. 
Indeed, recent reports have raised the concept of stand-alone cyber peace-
keepers. The suggestion that the United Nations should employ specific 
personnel to deal with the increasing number of cyber incidents taking 
place between States is indicative of the relevance of cyber operations for 
the conduct of UN-mandated peace operations.3  Although the feasibility 
of cyber-only peacekeeping occurring outside the context of a military op-
eration has been largely dismissed by technical experts,4 from a purely legal 
perspective it would certainly be within the purview of the Security Council 
to determine that cyber operations (whether in a specific situation or as a 
more general concept) amount to a threat to international peace and securi-
ty under Article 39 of the UN Charter and to authorize those actions that it 
considers appropriate.5  
                                                                                                                      
2. BEN WAGNER, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE 
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What then are the legal parameters governing peace operations with re-
gard to ongoing cyber threats? Do peacekeepers’ responsibilities extend to 
monitoring cyber threats? When may a peace operation be mandated to 
conduct cyber operations? How may peacekeepers respond to a cyber at-
tack against them? Are there any legal constraints on a troop-contributing 
State conducting cyber operations outside the mission area? These are 
some of the pertinent questions that arise. Answering them from an inter-
national law perspective will very much depend on the specifics of the 
cyber threat, the precise mandate of the peace operation and the operation-
al cyber capabilities of troop-contributing States, among other considera-
tions. We will, therefore, approach the issue in the following manner. First, 
we will briefly set the general context by defining and describing contem-
porary peace operations. We will then address the general law applicable to 
peace operations. Finally, we will discuss the potential types of cyber opera-
tions and the legal challenges they pose in more detail. 
 
II. PEACE OPERATIONS DEFINED 
 
For the purposes of this article, peace operations may be defined broadly 
to include not only traditional peacekeeping operations based on the three 
core principles of consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-
defense and defense of the mandate, but also peace enforcement opera-
tions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and peace building 
operations. Chapter VII enforcement differs fundamentally from other 
peace operations in that it does not require the consent of the target State 
or entity, and need not be impartial, reactive or restricted to defensive 
measures.6 Of particular importance in the cyber context, enforcement 
measures may also be directed against non-State entities that are deemed to 
pose a threat to international peace and security. Whether authorized by 
the Security Council under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter (or under 
Chapter VIII in the case of regional peacekeeping operations), the legitima-
cy of the operation flows from the Council’s primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security, which may be carried out by means of 
the mandate.7 
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Peace operations have changed dramatically since they began in 1948. 
In addition to the introduction of enforcement operations in ongoing con-
flicts, even traditional peacekeeping operations have expanded into com-
plex and multi-dimensional operations. Long established responsibilities of 
peacekeepers, such as monitoring ceasefires, are now supplemented by 
tasks which include, inter alia, the promotion of a stable environment, 
maintenance of public order, provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
protection of civilians from violations of humanitarian and human rights 
law to the extent possible under the terms of the mandate and the opera-
tional capabilities of the particular mission.8 In future operations, all of 
these tasks may include a cyber component. The utility of cyber operations 
in more robust peace operations, including peace enforcement operations, 
is also apparent. For example, the ability to prepare the battlespace, neutral-
ize networks and uncover and obtain documentary evidence will be useful 
tools in carrying out particular operations. The type of operation and its 
constituting mandate are important in determining what cyber operations 
can be undertaken by a mission. 
 
III. LAW APPLICABLE TO PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
The conceptual underpinning of, and the law applicable to, each type of 
operation depends on a complex interaction of general international law, 
human rights law, international humanitarian law and the domestic laws of 
both the host and troop-contributing States. However, the essential distinc-
tion in determining the applicable international legal framework is between 
those peace operations that fall below the threshold of armed conflict, for 
which the primary legal framework governing the operation (and any cyber 
operations which form part of it) is human rights law, and those which oc-
cur above that threshold. For operations occurring above the threshold, the 
law of armed conflict may apply. 
 
A. The Mandate 
 
The principal legal parameter determining the permissibility of actions tak-
en by a peace operation is the mandate established by the Security Council. 
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NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
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It may range from a limited mandate to monitor a peace agreement or 
ceasefire to a more ambitious one that includes tasks such as protection of 
civilians, creating a safe and secure environment and training of both civil-
ians and armed forces.9  
Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may also mandate 
non-forceful measures be taken in situations it deems to be a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such enforcement 
measures may include, inter alia, partial or total disruption of telecommuni-
cations which may well contain a cyber element. Although authorized un-
der Chapter VII and thus not requiring the consent of the host State, such 
operations fall somewhere between traditional peace operations and the 
more robust peace enforcement operations that have become common in 
recent years. Needless to say, not all cyber operations can be treated alike; 
those which would amount to a use of force would not fall within any 
mandate provided under Article 41. Whether a cyber operation amounts to 
a use of force or remains below that threshold raises issues identical to 
those discussed elsewhere in the present volume.10 
 
B. Human Rights 
 
For peace operations falling beneath the threshold of armed conflict, the 
primary legal paradigm is that of human rights. This includes both peace-
keeping operations conducting the more traditional tasks for which the use 
of force is a last resort in personal and unit self-defense or defense of the 
mandate, and those authorized under Chapter VII for which the right to 
use “all necessary means” is authorized, but in which peacekeepers are not 
involved as combatants in an armed conflict. 
Peace operations below the armed conflict threshold may, for instance, 
involve monitoring the implementation of, and compliance with, a peace 
agreement, or providing security in a post-conflict environment. In these 
cases, the international legal framework governing cyber operations is in-
                                                                                                                      
9. For a good illustration of an ambitious mandate, see the United Nations Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) mandate, containing by some counts no 
less than forty-nine different tasks for the operation. S.C. Res. 1565, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1565 (Oct. 1, 2004) and resolutions and documents referenced therein [hereinafter 
MONUC Mandate]. 
10. See, e.g., William Banks, The Role of Counterterrorism Law in Shaping ad Bellum Norms 
for Cyber Warfare, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 157 (2013); Laurie R. Blank, Interna-
tional Law and Cyber Threats from Non-State Actors, id. at 406; Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in 













ternational human rights law to the extent that the operation’s functions 
are being exercised in a way that can be equated with the exercise of juris-
diction by a State.11 States are bound by both international conventions and 
customary international human rights law. Several court decisions and qua-
si-judicial determinations have held that States’ human rights law obliga-
tions do not automatically cease to apply in extraterritorial peace opera-
tions, provided that jurisdiction is exercised.12 
Admittedly, there is no universal consensus on this question. The Unit-
ed States is one of the prominent opponents of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of human rights law. However, both universal and regional human 
rights bodies, as well as a significant number of individual States have ac-
cepted—or have had to accept—that human rights law does not automati-
cally cease to apply when operating beyond the State’s borders. Although 
the question of when a State exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction has been 
addressed in numerous cases under the different human rights instruments, 
it will not be addressed in detail in this article beyond noting that the test 
may generally be seen as one of effective control over territory, or authority 
and control over persons.13  
International organizations such as the United Nations are also bound 
by customary international law, including human rights law. As with States, 
if and when an international organization exercises effective control over 
territory or physical control over one or more persons, the international 
organization is bound to respect the human rights of those who find them-
selves within its jurisdiction. In the case of the United Nations, the binding 
force of international human rights law flows from its international legal 
personality, and is further strengthened by the UN Charter, the UN Safety 
Convention,14 and their internal rules and practice.15  
                                                                                                                      
11. Jann K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, 
at 67. 
12. The International Court of Justice, UN Human Rights Committee, European 
Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have each 
found that their instruments apply extraterritorially on the basis of jurisdiction.  
13. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); Ola Engdahl, The Future of 
Human Rights Law in Peace Operations, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW 
AS IT SHOULD BE 105 (Ola Engdahl & Pål Wrange eds., 2008). 
14. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 












Cyber operations carried out in the context of peace operations below 
the threshold of an armed conflict are thus governed by such human rights 
law provisions as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, etc., provided that the person whose rights are at issue finds 
himself or herself within the jurisdiction of the international organization 
or troop-contributing State. While the legal basis to conduct cyber opera-
tions may stem from the authorization in the Security Council resolution or 
from self-defence, the actual conduct of such operations is subject to the 
constraints of human rights law. The UN Human Rights Council has con-
firmed that “the same rights people have offline must also be protected 
online.”16 In other words, if jurisdiction is being exercised in a peace opera-
tion and it is considered necessary to gather intelligence or conduct opera-
tions in the cyber realm—for example, in order to prevent so called “spoil-
ers” from reigniting an armed conflict or to prevent online postings that 
incite racial hatred—interference with cyber infrastructure or data must be 
carried out in compliance with the requirements of human rights law.  
 
C. Law of Armed Conflict 
 
When a peace operation involves the conduct of hostilities with a State or 
organized armed group that crosses the threshold of armed conflict, the 
law of armed conflict applies. The applicability of that body of law was 
confirmed in the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, “[o]bservance by UN 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law,” which sets out the fundamen-
tal principles and rules applicable to UN peacekeepers.17 The bulletin’s im-
portance has been reemphasized in “United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions: Principles and Guidelines,” also referred to as the Capstone Doc-
trine.18  
                                                                                                                      
15. Kleffner, supra note 11, at 67. As examples, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which 
establishes promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights as one of the pur-
poses of the organization, and Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General’s Policy 
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by one component. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 14, 27. 
16. U.N. Human Rights Council, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights 
on the Internet, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (2012). 
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of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999). 













While there is little debate over the application of the law to the troops 
on the ground, a question does remain concerning which entity becomes 
the party to the armed conflict—the troop-contributing State, the respon-
sible international organization (whether the United Nations, NATO, etc.) 
or both.19 Likewise, the determination of whether and for what time the 
relevant legal actor is to be considered a party to an armed conflict involves 
complex issues of fact and law that must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis in light of the factual environment and the operationalization of the 
mandate for the specific operation within that environment. Some of the 
factors to be taken into account include, inter alia: 
  
 relevant Security Council resolutions; 
 specific operational mandates;  
 roles and practices actually adopted by the operation during the con-
flict; 
 rules of engagement and operational orders;  
 nature of the arms and equipment used by the force;  
 interaction between the operation’s forces and the parties involved in 
the conflict, including any use of force between the operation’s forces 
and the parties in an armed conflict, and the nature and frequency of 
such force; and  
 the conduct of the alleged victim(s) and their fellow personnel.20  
 
Similarly, whether individual members of a peace operation directly partici-
pate in hostilities requires a case-by-case assessment of whether the re-
quired threshold of harm, causation and belligerent nexus exists.21 
Operations in which the hostilities amount to an armed conflict solely 
between a peace operation and an adversary, with no other parties in-
volved, will be fairly exceptional. It is more likely that a peace operation 
will be deployed into an ongoing armed conflict or into a volatile situation 
that then deteriorates into an armed conflict. As it is not a party to the con-
                                                                                                                      
19. For a more detailed examination of the question than is possible in this article, see 
Ola Engdahl, Multinational Peace Operations Force Involved in Armed Conflict: Who Are the 
Parties?, in SEARCHING FOR A “PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 233 (Kjetil M. Larsen et al. eds., 2012). 
20. Cf mutatis mutandis Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-
T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 234 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009). 
21. See generally NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, IN-
TERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNA-












flict, in these situations the peace operation cannot, without more, conduct 
military operations that would be subject to the law of armed conflict, nor 
can it be made the object of attack, whether through cyber means or oth-
erwise. The right to conduct operations governed by the law of armed con-
flict requires that the peace operation be a party to the armed conflict. If it 
is not, its members enjoy the protection that international law provides to 
civilians, as well as the specific protections provided by the UN Safety 
Convention. 
Finally, although controversial and the subject of much scholarly de-
bate, the law of occupation may also apply to peace operations in certain 
circumstances, whether de jure or by analogy.22 It is sufficient for the pur-
poses of this article to note that territory is only considered occupied when 
it is actually placed under the authority of the occupying force and the law 
extends only to the territory where that authority has been established and 
can be exercised.23 While cyber operations may be used in exercising an 
occupying power’s authority, they would not be sufficient on their own to 
establish an occupation.24 Thus, the use of cyber operations to project the 
execution of a peace operation’s mandate into areas outside its effective 
physical control, for example, by monitoring communications, would not 
extend the application of the law of occupation to those areas.  
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the general legal framework 
applicable to different types of cyber operations and the different contexts 
in which such cyber operations may occur. These scenarios are: first, de-
ployment of a peace operation into a situation of ongoing cyber operations 
between third parties; second, the use of force by a peace operation in re-
sponse to cyber attacks; third, cyber operations conducted by a peace oper-
ation to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and, 
fourth, the conduct of offensive cyber operations by peace operations. Alt-
hough these different scenarios may overlap to a certain extent, they raise 
distinct legal issues; hence, they will be treated separately. 
 
                                                                                                                      
22. See, e.g., Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability of the Law of Occupation to Peace Forces, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS 133 
(Gian L. Beruto ed., 2008). 
23. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
24. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-













IV. SITUATIONS WHERE THERE ARE ONGOING CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
When peacekeepers find themselves deployed in a situation in which there 
are ongoing cyber operations between third parties (State-based or other-
wise), the mission’s obligations and authority with regard to their response 
to those acts will be dependent on its mandate. However, some general 
observations may be made.  
Clearly, when a peace operation is specifically tasked with acting in sit-
uations where there are ongoing cyber operations, it will be authorized to 
monitor and conduct cyber operations in response to cyber threats. Given 
the differing capabilities of troop-contributing States in terms of expertise 
and equipment, however, it seems likely that any specific requirement will 
contain caveats in terms of acting within the mission’s capabilities and re-
sources.25  
A more likely—and perhaps more interesting—scenario may occur 
when a peace operation is tasked by the Security Council with deploying 
into an ongoing security situation that contains a cyber element, but where 
the mandate does not expressly refer to cyber operations.26 For example, 
two of the traditional tasks of peacekeeping operations have been to pro-
mote a safe and secure environment and create the conditions for a lasting 
political solution to a conflict through the monitoring of a ceasefire and the 
parties’ adherence to their commitments under the agreement. In such a 
case, the generic mandate may be interpreted broadly enough to include the 
monitoring of Internet traffic, as well as monitoring activities in physical 
space; however, the permissible methods used to perform those tasks will 
differ depending on the robustness of the mandate and the level of the 
                                                                                                                      
25. Similar wording is currently used with respect to protection of civilians in other 
peace operations. See, for example, MONUC, which is authorized “within its capabilities and 
in area where its armed units are deployed . . . to ensure the protection of civilians.” S.C. 
Res. 1592, ¶ 5, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005) (emphasis added). The initial in-
structions to the African Union mission in Darfur provided that it was to “[p]rotect civil-
ians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity within re-
sources and capability.” Communiqué, Peace and Security Council (Oct. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/news_events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu 
%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf (emphasis added).  
26. This article will restrict itself to the use of technology for monitoring cyber opera-
tions. For a discussion of some of the issues raised by intrusive intelligence gathering in 
peacekeeping operations, see Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence 
Gathering, 28 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 687 (2007); A. Walter Dorn, 
The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping, 12 INTERNATIONAL 












threat. For example, although all data traffic coming into and out of the 
mission’s networks can be monitored as a matter of good network security, 
the permissibility of using particular technologies, such as deep packet in-
spection (DPI),27 outside of the mission’s own networks depends on 
whether the applicable law permits those actions.  
As noted above, both troop-contributing States and the United Nations 
must comply with human rights law in peace operations in areas subject to 
their jurisdiction. In the scenario of conducting DPI, the human rights of 
privacy and freedom of expression come to the fore. Neither of these 
rights are absolute. International human rights law permits certain interfer-
ences with them for reasons of national security and public order.28 Such 
exceptions are subject to proportionality requirements. Thus, the parame-
ters established for the use of DPI technology would need to be carefully 
thought through to avoid casting too wide a net.29  
It should also be noted in considering multinational operations that in 
addition to differing approaches to the extraterritorial application of human 
rights law, judicial approaches to the use of DPI technologies also vary de-
pending on the domestic jurisdiction. The United States and European Un-
ion member States, for example, have adopted different standards. Ongo-
                                                                                                                      
27. Deep packet inspection involves looking at the content of the packets of infor-
mation that make up a data stream, rather than merely the TCP/IP routing information 
contained in the header of the packet. While there are legitimate uses for deep packet in-
spection that could be valuable to a UN mission (for example, prioritizing particular kinds 
of data traffic, e.g., Skype), any use that makes the content of the packet available to 
someone other than the sender and receiver of the message may risk infringing the right to 
privacy by arbitrarily interfering with communications. Additionally, European Union 
(EU) member States may run afoul of the EU framework directive on privacy and elec-
tronic communications and the EU data protection directive. Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (Oct. 24, 1995), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.  
28. Cf. Article 19(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Although Article 17 on the right to 
privacy contains no explicit reference to exceptions on grounds of national security and 
public order, it allows for such exceptions, provided an interference with a person’s priva-
cy is neither arbitrary nor unlawful. 
29. In the words of the Human Rights Committee, restrictions on the right of free-
dom of expression “must be ‘provided by law’ [and they] may only be imposed for one of 
the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be justi-
fied as being ‘necessary’ for . . . one of those purposes.” Human Rights Committee, Gen-
eral Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), U.N. Doc. HR1/GEN/1/rev.1 













ing court cases are in the process of determining the contours of the right 
of government entities to engage in such behaviors. While the law remains 
far from settled at the time of this writing, rules of engagement for peace 
operations deployed in situations where there are ongoing cyber operations 
should be drafted in such a manner that the permissible limits on the use of 
DPI or other Internet surveillance technologies are clear. It makes no dif-
ference whether the peace operation is conducted with the consent of the 
host State or the Security Council has authorized the use of “all necessary 
means” as the rights’ holder is the individual. While a Chapter VII mandate 
would allow States to claim legal authority for surveillance or interception, 
it is likely that most complaints regarding this technology would relate to 
the alleged arbitrariness of the surveillance or interception. Differences in 
interpretation may then be reflected in the national caveats of the troop-
contributing States. 
Once the applicable law for a peace operation has become the law of 
armed conflict, the problem is significantly alleviated. Although human 
rights law continues to apply during armed conflict,30 the law of armed 
conflict permits the employment of those measures necessary for obtaining 
information about the enemy.31 In fact, parties to an armed conflict are 
obliged to do so in order to meet the required precautions in attack. Such 
specific regulations in the law of armed conflict would prevail over the 
more generic conflicting rules of human rights law (lex specialis derogat lege 
generali). 
 
V. USE OF FORCE IN RESPONSE TO CYBER ATTACKS 
 
Despite the protections afforded to UN personnel,32 peace operations have 
increasingly come under attack from those seeking to derail fragile peace 
processes or manipulate hostile environments for their own purposes. 
While there is no public record to date on the use of cyber attacks against 
UN peace operations specifically, other UN organs and the armed forces 
                                                                                                                      
30. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
31. Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 24.  
32. Protection of UN peacekeepers may stem from their status as civilians under the 
law of armed conflict or specific treaty protections provided by the UN Safety Conven-
tion, supra note 14, and its Optional Protocol. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. Res. 60/42, U.N. Doc. 












of troop-contributing States have been the subject of cyber operations.33 
There is no reason to believe peace operations will remain untouched by 
this phenomenon. How then may a peace operation respond to such at-
tacks?  
In the first instance, peace operations may be specifically authorized by 
the mandate to use force to protect its personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment.34 Even absent such an explicit mandate, it is submitted that 
peace operations also have the authority to use force in response to cyber 
operations directed against them as an exercise of self-defense, either by an 
individual soldier, the unit or in extended self-defense (i.e., defense of the 
mandate.)  
At their inception, UN peace operations operated under the principle 
of non-use of force except in self-defense. The notion of self-defense has 
subsequently come to include the authority to use force in response to 
armed attempts to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.35 De-
fense of the mandate is now part of the approved UN guidelines and regu-
lations for peacekeeping operations.36 The right to use force against armed 
attempts to interfere with the execution of the mandate is not limited to 
operations authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is equally 
available in more traditional peacekeeping operations, although these oper-
ations must also conform with the “bedrock principles of UN Peacekeep-
                                                                                                                      
33. For example, Operation Shady RAT, which was a five-year espionage operation 
discovered in 2011. It was conducted by an unnamed State actor and directed against mul-
tiple entities (companies, governments and non-governmental organizations), including 
the United Nations. There have also been other low-level attacks specifically directed 
against UN agencies by non-State groups and individual actors. See Dmitri Alperovitch, 
Revealed: Operation Shady RAT, MCAFEE (2011), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/ 
white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf; United Nations Agency “Hacking Attack” 
Investigated, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
15951883. 
34. See, e.g., the MONUC mandate, which authorizes MONUC to use all necessary 
means within its capability and in the areas where its armed units are deployed “to ensure 
the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.” MO-
NUC Mandate, supra note 9, ¶¶ 4(c), 6. 
35. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 34. 
36. Hans F.R. Boddens Hosang, Force Protection, Unit Self-Defence, and Extended Self-
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ing, namely impartiality and the necessity of consent and maintenance of 
consent of all parties to a conflict.”37  
What emerges from the foregoing as important in an examination of 
the legal parameters governing the use of force against cyber attacks is that 
the notion of self-defense in the context of peace operations can take on 
different meanings. It can mean personal self-defense by an individual sol-
dier, unit self-defense or extended self-defense of the mandate. A distinc-
tion between those different forms of self-defense is legally relevant be-
cause the quintessential requirements for a lawful invocation of any of 
these, i.e., necessity and proportionality, will lead to different results as to 
the permissible degree of the use of force.38  
When a cyber operation directed against a peace operation is severe 
enough to amount to armed force—that is, it causes death or injury to per-
sons, or physical damage, including loss of functionality, to property and 
equipment—UN peacekeeping forces are authorized to use force in self-
defense to the extent that such use of force complies with the requirements 
of necessity and proportionality. In other words, the use of force must be 
necessary to achieve the objective of defending the force and the amount 
of force must be proportional, that is, it must not greatly exceed the scale 
and intensity of the attack against which force is used in self-defense.39 If a 
cyber operation interferes with the peace operation in such a manner that 
peacekeeping forces cannot perform their mission (e.g., the command and 
control systems of the operation have been compromised by a cyber at-
tack) the UN forces would be entitled to use force in defense of the man-
date under the same conditions. The use of force by the peacekeeping 
forces may be kinetic or cyber in nature. 
A separate question is the right of a UN peace enforcement operation 
authorized under Chapter VII to use force against cyber threats that do not 
themselves amount to a use of force, but which nevertheless interfere with 
the ability of the enforcement operation to carry out its tasks. When peace 
enforcement operations are mandated under Chapter VII to use all neces-
                                                                                                                      
37. TERRY D. GILL ET AL., GENERAL REPORT FOR THE 19TH CONGRESS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR 20 (2012), available 
at http://ismllw.org/congres/2012_05_01_Quebec_General%20Report_Congress-
EN.pdf 
38. With regard to personal self–defense, see Hans F.R. Boddens Hosang, Personal 
Self-Defence and Its Relationship to Rules of Engagement, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 6, at 429. With regard to 
force protection and extended self–defense of the mandate, see Hosang, supra note 36. 












sary means, such operations are authorized to enforce the mandate at all 
times. Consequently, enforcement authority is not limited to defense 
against armed interference (reactive), but extends to enforcing any element 
in the resolution in order to restore or maintain international peace and 
security (proactive).40  
Ironically, the usual difficulty in positively attributing the source of 
cyber threats and distinguishing between those that constitute attacks and 
those that are mere criminal acts may be less problematic in peace opera-
tions. When cyber operations are conducted against a peace operation that 
interferes with carrying out the mandate, the peace operation may respond 
in self-defense or defense of the mandate regardless of the origin of the 
attack. Likewise, if the Security Council mandates a peace operation to 
maintain law and order, contributing States should use all means reasonably 
available to them to implement the mandate.41 Thus, the international force 
can deal with cyber threats that may destabilize the peace operation. 
 Recent events in which significant unrest has been created by cyber ac-
tivities illustrate the relevance of this point. For example, in August 2012, a 
mass exodus of twenty to thirty thousand migrant workers from Bengaluru 
to their home States in northeastern India was prompted by the combina-
tion of SMS, social media and morphed photos appearing to depict vio-
lence against Muslims.42 While the majority of messages appear to have 
been sent by bulk SMS text and MMS messages, social media and websites 
have borne the brunt of the government’s response to the crisis. In addi-
tion to issuing public statements and imposing a ban on bulk text messag-
es, the Indian government blocked 245 webpages for “hosting provocative 
and harmful content” and has said it will share evidence with the govern-
ment of Pakistan to back claims that the messages came from that coun-
try.43 If a peace operation mandated with the maintenance of law and order 
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were confronted with a similar situation, it stands to reason that it could 
take similar measures, provided that such measures were necessary and 
proportional under the circumstances. 
 
VI. CYBER OPERATIONS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS 
 
Following a series of tragic incidents, the Security Council has increasingly 
granted peace operations the authority to use force to “protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence.”44 The mandate to protect ci-
vilians is typically limited to the extent that such protection is possible and 
within mission capabilities. Conceptually, the right to use force to protect 
civilians can be viewed, in part, as an extension of the domestic law con-
cept of the right of individual self-defense, which generally allows for de-
fense of a third party, and, in part, as having a distinct basis in the express 
provisions of the operation’s mandate and its attendant rules of engage-
ment.45 When endowed with such a mandate, a peace operation is entitled 
to use force when the lives or safety of civilians come under imminent 
threat of physical danger from a cyber operation, for example, the opening 
of floodgates on a dam by cyber means. A more difficult question, howev-
er, is the ability of the peace operation to use force against a cyber opera-
tion that is not so directly linked to physical danger, because the mandate 
to protect civilians is regularly limited to circumstances where the threats of 
physical violence are “imminent.”  
Unfortunately, what the Security Council means by imminence is not 
clear. Political leaders, UN departments, the UN force commander and 
national contingent commanders all have an impact on how this term—
and the mandate more generally—is interpreted and operationalized in the 
field.46 As the Bangalore panic illustrates, cyber operations are certainly ca-
pable of making civilian populations believe they are in imminent physical 
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danger, and, in certain circumstances, cyber operations are linked with very 
real physical threats. For example, repressive regimes use cyber operations 
to locate, track and surveil opposition networks and potential dissidents.47 
Whether the correlation between tracking the civilian subjects of that sur-
veillance and their ultimate death or disappearance is direct enough to ar-
gue that the imminence requirement is satisfied will depend very much on 
the context. When the condition is met, the legal justification required for 
the destruction of the functionality of the surveillance system or the rele-
vant part of it, whether by kinetic or cyber means, may flow from the ex-
plicit mandate to protect civilians, or if an explicit mandate to protect civil-
ians is absent, such a legal justification could arguably flow from an extend-
ed concept of the right of self-defense. 
Irrespective of the legal justification, the use of force to protect civil-
ians under imminent threat of physical violence is constrained by the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality. Both principles would, as a general 
rule, militate against the necessity of the use of lethal force in response to 
cyber operations that are the source of an imminent threat. This is because 
it will generally be possible to counter a cyber threat by technological 
measures, such as diverting a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
stream or blocking a port, rather than using lethal force against the person 
conducting the attack. Given the non-linear progression of technological 
development, however, the use of force cannot be ruled out. Moreover, as 
noted previously, the mandate to protect civilians is typically expressed in 
terms of “to the extent possible” and “within mission capabilities.” To 
date, peace operations, particularly those conducted under the command 
and control of the United Nations, have had limited technological capacity 
for intelligence and information analysis48 and thus may not possess the 
technical resources or abilities to prevent cyber operations from affecting 
the civilian population.  
The use of force in self-defense—including in defense of the mandate 
or defense of civilians—does not necessarily mean the forces are involved 
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in an armed conflict such that the laws of armed conflict apply.49 It is only 
when a peace operation becomes so actively engaged with a State or orga-
nized armed group that hostilities reach the level of armed conflict that the 
law of armed conflict will apply.50 In such a case, the right to respond to 
cyber operations is not constrained by the limits of self-defense; members 
of the armed forces and military objectives of the adversary may be lawfully 
attacked. Likewise, of course, the military personnel and military equipment 
of the peace operation, including military cyber infrastructure and infor-
mation systems, become lawful targets.  
 
VII. PEACE OPERATIONS CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS 
 
To date there is no public record of cyber operations being used by a UN 
peace operation. The United States has stated that it used cyber operations 
successfully in Afghanistan.51 However, given the dual nature of the U.S. 
presence in the country and the double-hatted command of the troops in-
volved, it is not possible to determine whether the cyber operations were 
conducted under the auspices of the UN-mandated, NATO-led Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force or the independent U.S. Operation Endur-
ing Freedom. Cyber attacks to disrupt or disable the Libyan air defense 
networks prior to strikes by coalition aircraft were also contemplated by 
the United States in that UN-mandated operation, but the idea was dis-
carded in the early stages of operational planning and conventional strikes 
were ultimately used to achieve the same results.52 For a peace operation 
constrained in its use of armed force and likely to be involved in a subse-
quent transition to reconstruction and development efforts, the ability to 
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merely turn off a network rather than destroying it means that cyber opera-
tions will prove a useful tool in the toolbox of peace operations.  
Cyber operations may also allow the mission to project their mandate 
into regions beyond its area of deployment, which it could not otherwise 
reach with current capabilities. In addition to their utility for intelligence 
and monitoring activities, cyber operations provide the ability to remotely 
shut down the networks of opposing actors, allowing for a significant ad-
vantage to a mission seeking to disrupt the activities of those threatening a 
peace process. 
Furthermore, in many circumstances cyber operations provide a mis-
sion with a non-forceful method to influence the actors involved in the 
process, consistent with the principle that a UN peace operation should 
only use force as a measure of last resort after other methods of persuasion 
have been exhausted.53 This includes enabling the mission to take action 
against outside interference that may be inflaming an already tense situa-
tion. For example, the 2007 cyber incidents that accompanied rioting in 
Estonia were largely conducted from outside the country.54 Attack scripts 
were passed in Russian language forums and posted on Russian-hosted 
websites. Similarly, websites hosting generic attack scripts for use in the 
cyber elements associated with Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in 
2008 and 2009 were hosted in multiple jurisdictions by both sides. A site 
called “Help Israel Win” that sought volunteers for a botnet dubbed “Pa-
triot” was moved multiple times in response to attacks from the opposing 
side. Opposing hacker teams were located in multiple jurisdictions, and in-
cluded hackers of Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Turkish, Algerian and Moroc-
can origin.55 Comparable situations of outside interference could easily con-
front a peace operation. 
While the specific legal issues raised depend, among other things, on 
the nature of the cyber action, the type of mandate, applicable law and the 
facts on the ground, a number of progressively offensive oriented cyber 





                                                                                                                      
53. Capstone Doctrine, supra note 8, at 35. 
54. See TIKK, KASKA & VIHUL , supra note 1, at 23 & nn.76–88. 
55. GREYLOGIC, PROJECT GREY GOOSE, PHASE II REPORT: THE EVOLVING STATE 













A. Removal or Blocking of Online Content  
Online content—whether extremist websites, highly offensive video foot-
age or social media sites—have the potential to inflame, exacerbate and 
ignite tensions on the ground in areas where the peace operations are 
working. In some cases, online content may even be a direct incitement to 
physical violence. Removal of the content could, therefore, contribute to 
the promotion of a safe and secure environment in accordance with a 
peace operation’s mandate. If webhosts and Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) are unable or unwilling to remove the content, can peace operations 
proactively remove or block access to such materials? One of the factors 
will be where the content is posted. Peace operation mandates are generally 
geographically constrained to a specific territory or area of deployment. 
Thus, the authorization to act provided by the mandate—whether or not it 
involves the use of force—will be limited to that territory.56 The same is 
true of cross-border cyber operations conducted in an effort to remove 
potentially inflammatory content from sites outside the mission area.  
Blocking the availability of particular online content within the geo-
graphical confines of the mission area is a far easier way to accomplish the 
same effect. The most extreme example of governmental intervention in 
communications technology for security purposes is perhaps the Egyptian 
government’s actions in completely shutting off access to the Internet for 
four days during the Arab Spring. Other States have taken a more nuanced 
approach by blocking specific sites or particular content. While States, such 
as China, with its “great firewall,” and regimes in the Middle East and 
North Africa that engage in heavy web filtering and censorship have tech-
nology in place to make such a task easy, other States also have the capacity 
to engage in such behaviors.57 For example, India blocked access to ap-
proximately 250 websites in an effort to stop the spread of videos and im-
ages that caused the Bangalore panic. The Afghan government pushed In-
ternet providers in that country to bar access to websites hosting an anti-
Islamic video in order to head off potentially violent demonstrations.58  
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While it appears reasonable to assume that peace operations can block 
the availability of particular online content within the geographical confines 
of the mission area on similar legal grounds as provided for by a mandate 
to protect civilians or one to provide a safe and secure environment, the 
human rights implications of doing so, particularly for a peace operation 
under UN command and control, are significant. In a “Joint Declaration 
on Freedom of Expression and the Internet,” rapporteurs on freedom of 
expression from the United Nations, Organization of American States and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s representative on freedom 
from the media stated, “[c]utting off access to the Internet, or parts of the 
Internet, for whole populations or segments of the public (shutting down 
the Internet) can never be justified, including on public order or national security 
grounds.”59 Although not legally binding, given the breadth of the organiza-
tions represented in the declaration, this statement will carry significant 
weight when applied to a UN peace operation. The right to freedom of 
expression is not absolute, however, and while blocking entire sections of 
the Internet may not be justified, restriction of certain content may be ap-
propriate if authorized by the mandate, proportionate under international 
standards and necessary to protect a recognized interest. Clearly, when the 
content amounts to incitement to commit crimes, such as genocide or cer-
tain other forms of hate speech, blocking of content would be permissible 
for the peace operation. 
 
B. Neutralization of Command and Control and Air Defense Networks 
 
The ability of cyber operations to neutralize networks without destroying 
them may prove to be a valuable tool for peace operations. For example, 
multiphase operations that involve policing no-fly zones or aerial monitor-
ing of disarmament programs may initially benefit from suppression or 
neutralization of the air defense networks. However, such networks will be 
needed once peace is restored and the operation moves on to supporting 
redevelopment.  
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Whether neutralizing, but not destroying, such a network is legally 
permissible depends on the categorization of the acts and the mandate of 
the particular operation. There has been a great deal of debate whether 
mere neutralization of a network by cyber means would amount to an at-
tack under the laws of armed conflict.60 Agreement appears to have been 
reached that destruction of the functionality of objects, to include network 
components, such that a physical component has to be replaced would 
amount to an attack.61 The same analysis may be used in evaluating whether 
actions by a peace operation constitute a use of force. Therefore, merely 
turning a network off as a proactive measure would not overstep an au-
thorization limiting the use of force to that necessary in self-defense.62 
Other potential restrictions on taking such an action would be dependent 
on the mandate for the particular operation and the associated rules of en-
gagement.  
Neutralization of computers engaging in cyber operations from outside 
the area of operations, such as against international “spoilers” that take part 
in DDoS attacks similar to those directed against Estonia, face the same 
geographical constraints outlined in the previous section with regard to re-
moval of content. At the same time, peace operation mandates in Security 
Council resolutions almost always call on member States to provide assis-
tance to peace operations. In some cases they require States to ensure that 
their nationals, individuals and firms within their territory or subject to 
their jurisdiction refrain from particular behaviors.63 As a result, peace op-
erations are able to call on the member State in which the perpetrators are 
located or of which they are nationals to assist in preventing “spoiler” ac-
tivities and punishing those who engage in such activities. Simultaneously, 
the peace operation could block and/or redirect the DDoS traffic emanat-
ing from particular Internet Protocol addresses using ISPs or webhosts lo-
cated in the geographical area of the peace operation.  
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C. Destruction of Surveillance or Command and Control Capabilities  
 
When more destructive offensive cyber measures are envisaged, such as 
those causing physical damage to equipment of the opposing party in non-
self-defense circumstances, authorization must derive from the mandate. 
As noted above, physical destruction by cyber means is a use of armed 
force and must, therefore, be authorized by the Security Council. Since tra-
ditional peacekeeping missions are authorized only to use force in self-
defense as defined above, offensive cyber operations are not permitted. 
Peace enforcement operations endowed with a Chapter VII authorization 
to use “all necessary means,” may, on the other hand, use force to enforce 
the mandate. Thus, offensive cyber operations causing damage, destruction 
or personal injury are authorized in any situation that kinetic force would 
be permissible, provided they are necessary to fulfill mission objectives. 
Likewise, when members of the peace operation find themselves actively 
engaged in hostilities under the laws of armed conflict, destructive offen-
sive cyber operations may be used against military objectives in accordance 




The foregoing analysis confirms that a detailed answer of the legal parame-
ters governing peace operations that confront or conduct cyber operations 
cannot be provided in the abstract. The mandates and capabilities of peace 
operations and the contexts in which they are deployed are too varied and 
complex. Nonetheless, one can draw some general conclusions.  
First, it seems certain that cyber operations directed against or con-
ducted by peace operations can be expected to increase. Second, it would 
appear equally reasonable to assume that the majority of instances in which 
peace operations are involved in cyber operations—either as actors engag-
ing in such activity or as the object of cyber operations of other actors—
will take place when the peace operation is not a party to an armed conflict; 
hence, it will not be operating under the law of armed conflict. To the ex-
tent this is true, international human rights law will remain at the fore as 
the main international legal framework governing cyber operations. 
Whether operating under a law of armed conflict regime or a human 
rights regime, peace operations will always be able to conduct cyber opera-
                                                                                                                      













tions of some type. Indeed, the importance of cyber capabilities is likely to 
increase in light of their operational utility and efficiency. Exactly what type 
of cyber operation will be legally permissible, and how intrusive, disruptive 
and offensive it may be, will however, ultimately depend on the specific 
mandate. 
 
